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S ince 2011, there has been widespread use of explosive weapons—including conventional weap-ons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and landmines—by all sides in the Syrian conflict.1 As is known from other contexts, a proportion of these either fail to detonate, becoming unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), or are abandoned by combatants to become abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).2 
Long after conflicts have ended, these explosive remnants of war (ERW) endure as multi-generational 
threats to a community’s population and future development.3
One of the first major challenges of dealing 
with the physical threat of ERW is assessing 
levels of explosive contamination in a given 
area. A vital aspect of this is conducting 
physical visits to field locations for a variety 
of activities, such as interviews and surveys. 
However, in places like Syria, this is not 
always possible due to insufficient access and 
other security, political, and financial con-
straints. Adapting to these challenges, many 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) organiza-
tions turn to desk-based, data-driven activi-
ties, such as non-technical surveys (NTS) 
or impact surveys, as a means to prepare for 
when conditions become available for con-
ducting operations on the ground.
In 2019, The Carter Center4 found an 
opportunity to engage productively via the 
Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project.5 
Using its unique, open-source conflict data-
set and an innovative method that counts 
the number and general category of explosive 
munitions mentioned within a conflict event,6 
it began analyzing and mapping informa-
tion about explosive weapons use in Syrian 
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communities. So far, The Carter Center has 
published four reports on southern Syria, 
areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and 
northeast Syria. It has extrapolated 267,267 
uses of explosive munitions in 2,485 commu-
nities from 63,344 reported conflict events.7 
A final report summarizing the whole of 
the country, including central Syria, will be 
released by the summer of 2021.
Not only does this desk assessment con-
tribute to the existing body of information on 
explosive weapons used in the Syrian conflict, 
it also provides a new tool at the operational 
level to assist with initial planning and priori-
tizing actions on the ground. For example, the 
findings can infer the likely location8 and gen-
eral category of potential explosive hazards.9 
This can act as a basic risk assessment tool for 
anyone seeking to travel to an area,10 especially 
HMA personnel. The study could also be used 
as a roadmap to help prioritize various tasks 
within HMA, including risk education (RE) 
activities and NTS, especially if other verified 
data is unavailable or verified data is slow to 
materialize.11 
The study aims to complement exist-
ing data, data-management tools, and soft-
ware, such as ArcGIS, Google Earth, the 
Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA), or Power BI. The study will 
be readily available in Excel/CVS file format 
for HMA actors to utilize for their own pur-
poses, compare with their own datasets,12 
and temporarily fill gaps in understanding. 
The study would effectively augment verified 
data until this type of data can be collected 
or released, or until an on-the-ground assess-
ment can be conducted. 
At the strategic level, the granularity pro-
vided by this type of study can give political 
and donor entities a better understanding of 
the scale and complexity of the issue of explo-
sive weapons contamination in Syria. This is 
especially true if the data from Syria is com-
pared to other environments where explo-
sive hazards clearance has taken place. The 
aims of the project firmly align it within key 
frameworks used in the HMA sector, namely 
the five pillars of mine action and the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals.13 
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events and the number of explosive munitions 
used in those conflict events grows consider-
ably. The result is a significant discrepancy 
in the understanding of explosive munitions 
used in a given context. 
The Carter Center’s project aims to rectify 
this limitation. Between 2013 and the present 
day, it has collected over 200,000 corrobo-
rated conflict events from a variety of open-
source outlets, including Syrian Observatory 
for Human Rights (SOHR), Syria Live Map, 
and the Armed Conflict and Location & Event 
Data Project (ACLED) data, as well as a small 
number of verified reports from the ground.16 
To the authors’ knowledge, this data had not 
been systematically analyzed for use in the 
HMA sector until now.
Using this data, one of the authors devel-
oped and applied a simple method to extrap-
olate the number of explosive munitions 
mentioned within a conflict event. In cases 
where numbers of explosive munition uses 
were mentioned, these were counted (e.g., an 
airstrike, two barrel bombs, three airstrikes). 
However in cases where the number of explo-
sive munitions were not explicitly mentioned 
(e.g., shelling, several air-
strikes, etc.), they were given 
a minimum count of three. 
This is because single and dou-
ble uses of explosive munitions 
were typically mentioned in the 
data, and so the most accurate 
but conservative guess for plu-
ral explosive munitions uses 
after this is three. This rule was 
used even if adjectives such as 
“intense” or “heavy” preceded 
the explosive munitions type 
in the conflict event (e.g., heavy 





Figure 2. Current method of mapping conflict events by 
counting conflict events (left), and the Explosive Munitions 
Use in Syria Project’s method of counting explosive 
munitions mentioned within conflict events provides a 
more detailed picture of the distribution of explosive 
munitions in a given area (right).
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
Figure 1. Two example rows of data used in The Carter Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project. 
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
Unique ID Incident Type Initiator Target Governorate District SubDistrict Town/Village Neighborhood Point of Interest Latitude Longitude Comments Total Killed Units Displayed Source URL Date
1 Aerial Bombardment NA NA Idleb Ma’rrat an Nu’man Khan Shavkun Hobit NA NA 35.4395 36.536 3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties. NA NA Carter Center Carter Center 11/29/2016
2 Shelling NA NA Idleb Jisr-Ash-Shugur Badama Maraand NA NA 35.7776 36.224 10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties NA NA Carter Center Carter Center 05/10/2016
Comments
3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties
10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties
One dataset that is particularly insightful 
for HMA organizations conducting desk-
based assessments is verified conflict data,14 
which is typically person-confirmed, known-
to-be-true information that details the type 
of conflict an area has experienced, the 
ammunition used, and the intensity of the 
fighting there. 
While useful, verified conflict data has 
limitations if used exclusively. A sizable 
amount of other types of data may be dis-
counted at times, especially open-source 
datasets and social media that have perceived 
accuracy or trust limitations, as the source of 
the information is not always clear or veri-
fied. Moreover, the process of verifying or 
confirming data is time consuming to do 
and sensitive to release in situations where 
conflict persists. In addition, the way cur-
rent conflict data is recorded and visualized 
is limited; often focusing on the events them-
selves, rather than the information contained 
within them, which can show key details 
about the number of explosive munitions in 
an event.15 This approach can lead to signifi-
cant discrepancies in how explosive weapons 
use in an area is understood. 
Taking two real examples from The Carter 
Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria 
Project, Conflict Event A records “three air-
strikes” in Hobit town, while Conflict Event 
B records “ten artillery bombardments” in 
Maraand town (Figure 1). In the current sys-
tem used by many HMA actors, the two con-
flict events would be analyzed and visualized 
in the same way: as two single-conflict events. 
However, there is obviously a significant dif-
ference in the number of explosive munitions 
mentioned in these two conflict events. Over 
time, and with a dataset of thousands of con-
flict events, the gulf between the number of 
Despite its limitations,18 the study nonethe-
less provides a useful starting point, identify-
ing a minimum count or baseline of explosive 
munitions used in a given area, from a dataset 
not typically employed in HMA. The data is 
divided into four groupings of air-launched 
munitions (excluding cluster munitions), 
ground-launched munitions (excluding clus-
ter munitions), air and ground cluster muni-
tions, and landmine/IED/UXO. Within each 
of these groupings, more details of the explo-
sive munitions used are given, such as barrel 
bombing, artillery shelling, or mortar shell-
ing, and thus can highlight the general type of 
hazards potentially in an area.19 Rather than 
it being viewed as an exact type or number 
of explosive munitions used in an area, this 
baseline count should be seen as providing a 
more detailed picture about the distribution 
of explosive munitions over an area (Figure 
2). The method does not attempt to replace 
verified datasets or HMA activities, but rather 
seeks to augment those efforts until condi-
tions become conducive to such activities or 
receive such data.
The Data and Method
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The Technical Tool
The potential of the project is wide-ranging 
and is already supported by some in the HMA 
community.20 At the operational level, the 
project functions as a basic risk assessment 
tool for initial planning stages and prioritiz-
ing HMA activities for actors traveling to a 
potentially contaminated area.21 Another use 
could be to help initially plan NTS and RE 
activities in a more systematic way, given that 
the findings cover the distribution of explo-
sive munitions across Syria (Figure 3).
Wider Applications and Future Outlook
Looking to the future, while the current 
study is applied to Syria, its methodology eas-
ily lends itself to other environments where 
HMA activity is needed or conducted, given 
that this type of project only requires open-
source conflict data as an input.27 Not only 
this, other information could supplement the 
Figure 3. Map of 
explosive munition uses 
in southern Syria from 
The Carter Center’s 
Explosive Munitions 
Use in Syria Project.22 
Figure courtesy of  
The Carter Center.
open-source data to strengthen the inference 
of explosive weapons use and potential con-
tamination, including other open-source con-
flict datasets, open-source data on explosive 
munitions clearance, satellite imagery detail-
ing explosive munitions damage, weather 
conditions during the events, information 
on how long communities remained under 
the control of an armed group, or the time a 
community spent close to a frontline to name 
a few (Figure 4).
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning (ML) could also be used to extract 
information about explosive munition uses 
At the strategic level, the study can aid 
political and funding advocacy efforts by bet-
ter highlighting the scale and complexity of 
the issue as well as an estimation of the signifi-
cant resources required. For example, if a per-
centage of between 10 percent and 30 percent23 
is given as the number of items that failed to 
detonate and applied to the 267,267 explosive 
munitions used in The Carter Center’s stud-
ies so far, this suggests that between 26,727 
and 80,180 explosive munitions are present 
in communities identified in southern Syria, 
areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and 
northeast Syria.24 Although it would not pro-
vide an exact dollar amount or hours needed 
for the clearance of UXO in Syria, compara-
tive analysis of estimated contamination 
levels, clearance rates, and the geographical 
size of contaminated areas with regions such 
as Iraq or Mozambique25 could go some way 
to creating a tangible reference into what is 
minimally required to deal with the UXO 
problem in Syria.26 
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More Accurate Inference of UXO Contamination
Other Open Source Datasets
Figure 4. Different layers of data that could improve the results of the Explosive 
Munitions Use in Syria Project.
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
from visual (video and photo) or text media 
from a wide range of sources, including social 
media tools like Twitter or Facebook. AI and 
ML would also improve the speed and effi-
ciency of the project; instead of manually 
extrapolating the explosive munition counts 
from each conflict event, it could be done 
automatically. 
The additional layers of information men-
tioned previously are by no means exhaustive, 
but could result in unprecedented findings 
on the validity and utility of open-source 
data and its usefulness in the HMA sector. 
As mentioned previously, rather than replace 
existing methods and systems in the HMA 
sector, the study would seek to augment these 
in cases where conditions are not available for 
HMA actors to obtain firsthand verified data 
from the ground and act as an initial phase of 
the desk assessment.
Used intelligently, open-source data could 
support different purposes outside of the 
HMA sector as well. For the peacebuilding 
sector, HMA and open-source data studies 
can be used as an entry point for conven-
ing and conducting initial practical discus-
sions between sides in a given context, as the 
topic of dealing with explosive munitions 
contamination is relatively neutral and is 
a problem that people often unanimously 
agree needs solving.28 If successful, HMA and 
Conclusion
and donor entities a tool that helps contextu-
alize and appraise the scale and complexity of 
the issue of explosive weapons contamination 
in an area, especially if used comparatively 
with other contexts. Not only limited to Syria, 
the project has strong potential in a number of 
other locations around the world, such as Libya, 
Ukraine, and Yemen as well as in neighboring 
sectors such as peacebuilding. The authors 
hope that this article encourages other entities 
to replicate this study in the future with their 
own conflict data to supplement their existing 
methods or datasets. 
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open-source data studies could then be used 
to build discussions on wider topics, such as 
humanitarian access issues, housing, land 
and property rights, or good governance. 
Examples of HMA being successfully imple-
mented in peacebuilding initiatives have been 
seen in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Sri 
Lanka, and Sudan.29 
By using open-source data and a method that 
counts explosive munition uses rather than con-
flict events, a detailed overview can illustrate 
the distribution of a variety of types of explosive 
munitions in a given area. This can give actors 
conducting initial desk-based assessments an 
advantage if other methods are ineffective or 
unavailable. This tool can be used to conduct a 
basic risk assessment for HMA actors, as well as 
add to HMA actors’ ability to plan and prioritize 
activities over a large area, such as NTS or RE 
activities. At the strategic level, the granularity 
provided by this type of study can give political 
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1. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Explosive Weapons Devastating Civilians: International Action Needed to Curtail Deaths, Long-Term Harm in 
Populated Areas (Feb 2020). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3k8WuUu. on 1 May 2020.
2. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Definitions (Nov 2001). Accessed from 
https://bit.ly/3z7MhM0. 
3. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), The Reverberating Effects of Explosive Weapon Use in Syria (Jan 2019), Page 4. Accessed from https://bit.
ly/2YTXiUY.  
4. The Carter Center is a nongovernmental organization guided by the principles of Founders Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter. Founded in 
partnership with Emory University, on a fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering, The Carter 
Center has helped to improve the lives of people in more than eighty countries by resolving conflicts, advancing democracy and human rights, 
preventing diseases, and improving mental health.
5. The Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project is run by the Syria Conflict Mapping Project, part of The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution 
Program on Supporting Peace in Syria.
6. As opposed to the common practice of counting the conflict event itself, which can contain multiple explosive munition uses.
7. The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra Governorates (Nov 
2019), The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), The Carter Center, 
Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 3: Northwest Syria: Aleppo, Idleb, and Latakia Governorates (Aug 2020), and The Carter 
Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 4: Northeast Syria: Al Hassakeh, Ar Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor Governorates (November 
2020). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3Ecb05G and 
8. Although it is understood that the data study alone cannot fully predict explosive weapons contamination as a variety of conditions are needed 
for the formation of this such as firing conditions, weather, ground type and age of munitions (to name some).
9. These weapons types are general such as air launched, ground launched shelling, rather than specific weapons manufacturers. It is 
also understood that a variety of factors contribute to the formation of explosive weapons contamination, not just where high levels of 
bombardments have occurred.
10. The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
11. Given that it takes considerable time and effort to verify or confirm an event or munition use.
12. For example, the data from the project could identify and establish suspected hazardous areas (SHA) polygons which could then later be 
entered in IMSMA and followed up by non-technical surveys.
13. As the project helps; 1) assist in raising awareness and prioritization of potential high risk areas of UXO contamination in Syria for risk 
education, 2) assist with prioritizing areas for on the risk mitigation activities and ground surveys as part of the initial stage of mine action, 
3) support advocacy efforts in the de-mining sector and donor levels, 4) bring together key decision makers from all sides of a conflict, 5) 
highlight the need for an effective long term policy response and 6) contribute to reducing the threat posed by explosive munitions and the 
lasting impact it has to people living in affected areas. 
14. For example, IMMAP, The Mosul Dashboard: Explosive Incidents (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3huWZGt.  
15. For example, Humanity and Inclusion (HI), The Use of Explosive Weapons in Syria; A Time Bomb in the Making (May 2015). Accessed from 
https://bit.ly/3ljXJPT. 
16. The Carter Center’s reports explain more about the data used. See The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; 
Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), Page 3. Accessed from https://bit.ly/2YIOhOk. 
17. For more details about this method, see The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural 
Damascus (Jan 2020), Page 3 - 4. Accessed from https://bit.ly/3CapDF0. 
18. Such as with the limited accuracy and trust of open source data, and the method likely under-counting the number of explosive munitions in a 
given conflict event, especially if no exact number of munitions was given.
19. This is as detailed as the study goes. It does not specify the exact weapon type used or manufacturer. For more information please see the 
aforementioned Carter Center reports.
20. The study was presented to members of the UNMAS Humanitarian Mine Action Syria Working Group in Amman on 15 September 2019 
after being invited to do so. This built on a proof of concept study focused on Eastern Ghouta and in Yemen in 2018 conducted by one of the 
authors.  In addition, at least 8 HMA actors focused on Syria have expressed interest in using the findings and method of the project for their 
work in Syria. Two HMA actors are currently testing the validity of the findings in their activities on the ground, while one has built in the 
method outlined in this project to enhance their own desk assessment process. 
21. The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
22. Map from The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra 
Governorates (Nov 2019), Accessed from https://bit.ly/2XcJvbH.  
23. A reasonable assumption based on previous studies such as RAND Corporation, Unexploded Ordnance Clean Up Costs; Implications of 
Alternative Protocols, (2005), Accessed from https://bit.ly/3npvIZX.  
24. With this count likely much higher given the limitations of the data, methodology and way UXO is formed.
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25. Partly available from open sources.
26. This is in addition to various issues such as lack of international appetite for funding in government areas of Syria, sanctions and terrorism laws 
applied to Syria, and limited access into the country and within for entities that conduct de-mining.
27. Such as Ukraine, Libya or in Yemen, where one of the authors conducted a pilot version of the explosive munitions project with Halo Trust in 
late 2018.
28. As The Carter Center did in January 2020 and mentioned in the following source The Carter Center, Using Conflict Data to Help Demining 
Efforts in Syria (Aug 2020), Accessed from https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/conflict_resolution/using-conflict-data-for-demining-
in-syria.html on 30 January 2021.
29. This often underutilized field was developed in the early 2000s from contexts in the 1990s, before being further enhanced in the mid 2010s. 
Two key reports on this topic that contains numerous examples of HMA being used in peacebuilding are 1) Geneva International Center for 
Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD), Mine Action and Mediation (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3ht2s0m  2) International Peace 
Research Institute (PIRO), Preparing the Ground for Peace – Mine Action in Support of Peace Building (Feb 2004). Accessed from https://bit.
ly/3lkFUAb.  
30. The completed project will span five reports and visualize and analyze a dataset of hundreds of thousands of explosive munitions uses 
extrapolated from tens of thousands of conflict events. This will cover thousands of communities in the 14 governorates of Syria from July 
2013 until the present day. This data will be freely available from The Carter Center Syria Program on request. The Carter Center is expected to 
regularly update the dataset in the future as part of a routine maintenance of the project to keep it relevant.
31. They are currently seeking to develop a pilot project in Ukraine, develop other information layers to be used in the project as well as its wider 
use in the peacebuilding sector.
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